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N

INTRODUCTION

In the late 1800s, my maternal great-grandfather, then a young adult, immigrated
to the United States from his rural village in Poland. He could not read or write in
Polish, and he spoke no English. In fact, he remained illiterate until his death in the
late 1950s. He was a poor, uneducated villager who joined thousands of other young
men emigrating from Europe to the United States by crossing the Atlantic Ocean on
steamships. After disembarking on the East Coast, many of these immigrants
boarded westbound trains to Chicago, eventually finding work in the factories,
foundries, and farms of the Midwest.
As the Trump administration called for restrictions on virtually all immigration
to the United States,1 I reflected on how ordinary my great-grandfather’s immigration
story was in his day. He had no money, owned no property, and possessed no special
skills. His sole qualification was his identity as an able-bodied white man. At the
time, this was almost the only requirement for starting a new life in the United
States. Today, his lack of financial resources or a job offer, and his non-existent
education, would most certainly disqualify him from obtaining an immigrant visa.2
Poverty-based immigration control has long been part of the U.S. immigration
story.3 Yet, until the Trump administration’s reform of the public charge policy, it
covered only those newcomers who would be entirely dependent on the U.S.
government for subsistence or institutionalized for long-term care at the government’s
1.

See President Trump’s Bold Immigration Plan for the 21st Century, The White House (May 21, 2019),
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/articles/president-trumps-bold-immigration-plan-21st-century/
(revealing President Donald Trump’s “immigration plan that will turn America’s broken immigration
system . . . into a point of pride and national unity” by implementing full border security, changing the
entire immigration landscape). The only immigrants exempt from these restrictions were those with
great achievements in the “merit based” system. Id.

2.

Today, thousands of permanent immigrant visas are granted each year based on several “visa categories.”
See generally Am. Immigr. Council, How the United States Immigration System Works (2019),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/how_the_united_states_
immigration_system_works.pdf [hereinafter How the U.S. Immigration System Works] (providing
an overview of the U.S. immigration system and the requirements for obtaining permanent visas). U.S.
employment is just one method for obtaining a permanent visa. Id. Under the employment-based
immigration category, permanent visas are granted on an employment-based preference system, which
includes “[p]ersons of extraordinary ability,” “members of [] professions” requiring advanced degrees,
“skilled workers,” “special immigrants” who are classified in a very particular subset of employment
positions, and “persons who will invest $500,000 to $1 million in a job-creating enterprise.” Id. Lack of
financial resources can serve as a basis for denying entry into the United States. See Public Charge Fact
Sheet, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., https://www.uscis.gov/archive/public-charge-fact-sheet
(last updated Mar. 10, 2021).

3.

Public Charge Fact Sheet, supra note 2. “An alien who is likely at any time to become a public charge is
generally inadmissible to the United States and is ineligible to become a lawful permanent resident.” Id. A
“public charge” is “an alien who receives one or more public benefits . . . for more than 12 months, in total,
within any 36-month period . . . .” Id. Prior to the enactment of federal public charge policies, some
colonies adopted their own policies for rejecting impoverished immigrants. See James R. Edwards, Jr.,
Ctr. for Immigr. Stud., Public Charge Doctrine: A Fundamental Principle of American
Immigration Policy 2–3 (May 2001), https://cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/articles/2001/back701.pdf
(detailing the history of the public charge doctrine in America, beginning in 1645 in Massachusetts).
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expense.4 Those newcomers were considered a “public charge,”5 and were denied
either entry to the United States or—for those who had already entered—the ability
to become lawful permanent residents, or “green card” holders.6
However, in January 2017 and February 2018, internal Trump administration
memos were leaked to the press that detailed a crackdown on immigrants, described
tightened welfare requirements, and revealed significant planned changes to the
public charge determination.7 Then, on October 10, 2018, the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) proposed a regulatory change to this longstanding public
charge policy, which would prevent the immigration of any person likely to use
certain healthcare, nutrition, or housing programs after entering the United States.8
Following the publication of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for this
new rule, more than two hundred sixty thousand public comments were submitted,
the vast majority opposing it.9
The final rule was published on August 14, 2019 and included three major
changes to the existing public charge policy.10 First, it dramatically altered the public
4.

Danilo Trisi, Ctr. On Budget & Pol’y Priorities, Trump Administration’s Overbroad Public
Charge Definition Could Deny Those Without Substantial Means a Chance to Come to or
Stay in the U.S. 1 (May 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/5-30-19pov.pdf.

5.

Id.; see also Nat’l Immigr. L. Ctr., Changes to “Public Charge” Instructions in the U.S. State
Department’s Manual 1 (2018), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PIF-FAMSummary-2018.pdf [hereinafter Changes To “Public Charge” Instructions] (providing a similar
definition).

6.

Trisi, supra note 4, at 3.

7.

See Dara Lind, Exclusive: Trump’s Draft Plan to Punish Legal Immigrants for Sending US-Born Kids to
Head Start, Vox, https://www.vox.com/2018/2/8/16993172/trump-regulation-immigrants-benefitspublic-charge (last updated Feb. 8, 2018) (discussing the draft of a new rule released in February 2018,
“allow[ing] the government to keep immigrants from settling in the US” by extending the “government’s
power to bar an immigrant from entering the United States, obtaining a new visa, or becoming a lawful
permanent resident (green-card holder) by labeling the immigrant a likely ‘public charge’”) (parentheses
in original); see also Matthew Yglesias & Dara Lind, Read Leaked Drafts of 4 White House Executive
Orders on Muslim Ban, End to DREAMer Program, and More, Vox (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.vox.
com/policy-and-politics/2017/1/25/14390106/leaked-drafts-trump-immigrants-executive-order
(detailing the documents leaked in January 2017, including an order proposing to “build [a wall] around
the welfare state” by deeming any immigrant who is “likely to get any benefit” a “public charge”)
(emphasis in original).

8.

Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51114 (proposed Oct. 10, 2018) (to be codified
at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212–214, 245, 248); see also Final Rule on Public Charge Ground of Inadmissibility,
U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., https://www.uscis.gov/archive/final-rule-on-public-chargeground-of-inadmissibility#:~:text=a%20corresponding%20correction.-,On%20Oct.,to%20all%20
significant%20public%20comments (last updated Feb. 24, 2020) (listing public benefits considered in
public charge determinations in the “Questions and Answers” section).

9.

Charles Wheeler, DHS Finalizes Public Charge Rule, Cath. Legal Immigr. Network, https://
cliniclegal.org/resources/ground-inadmissibility-and-deportability/public-charge/dhs-finalizes-publiccharge-rule (last updated Aug. 12, 2019).

10.

Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41292 (Aug. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 8
C.F.R. pts. 103, 212–214, 245, 248); see also Final Rule on Public Charge Ground of Inadmissibility, supra
note 8 (explaining the three changes the final rule makes to the public charge rule). Due to the large
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charge definition, replacing the ‘reliance on government benefits for survival’
criterion with an assessment of whether the applicant would likely need more than
twelve months of government benefits over a thirty-six-month period.11
The second change expanded the “totality of circumstances” test by adding
numerous factors weighing negatively against a person attempting to immigrate to
the United States.12 Prior to this expansion, when making a public charge
determination, an immigration adjudicator would consider the applicant’s age, health,
family status, assets, resources, financial status, education, and skills, and could also
consider an affidavit of support.13 No one factor was dispositive, and the adjudicator
was required to consider and balance all factors in totality.14 Under the new rule,
specific factors were weighed negatively against an applicant, including being a child
or a senior, or having financial struggles.15 Thus, a person could be labeled a public
charge even if they were not receiving any government benefits, but were simply
young, old, or had low income.16
The third change incorporated certain government benefit programs into the
public charge policy.17 These included federally-funded Medicaid, the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP,” formerly known as food stamps), and
Section 8 housing assistance.18 Their addition as negative factors created another
number of comments DHS had to consider, the rule was not finalized until a year after its proposal.
Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41292 (Aug. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 8
C.F.R. pt. 103, 212–214, 245, 248). Following the final publication, DHS issued a correction to the
final rule on October 2, 2019. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds; Correction, 84 Fed. Reg.
52357 (Oct. 2, 2019) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212–214, 245, 248).
11.

Erin Quinn & Sally Kinoshita, An Overview of Public Charge and Benefits, Immigrant Legal Res.
Ctr. (Mar. 2020), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/overview_of_public_charge_and_
benefits-march2020-v3.pdf.

12.

Kaiser Fam. Found., Changes to “Public Charge” Inadmissibility Rule: Implications for
Health and Health Coverage 2 (Aug. 12, 2019), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Fact-SheetChanges-to-Public-Charge-Inadmissibility-Rule-Implications-for-Health-and-Health-Coverage
[hereinafter Changes to “Public Charge” Inadmissibility Rule]. The rule change also identified
two positive factors. See id. at 3, 6 (listing over a dozen characteristics that are considered negative, while
only listing “having income [or assets and resources] above 250% of the [federal poverty level]” and
“having private health insurance that is not subsidized by Affordable Care Act tax credits” as positive).

13.

See Changes To “Public Charge” Instructions, supra note 5.

14.

Id.; Cmty. Serv. Soc’y of N.Y., Public Charge 1 (Aug. 2020), http://lghttp.58547.nexcesscdn.
net/803F44A/images/nycss/QA_on_Public_Charge_(1).pdf.

15.

See supra note 12 and accompanying text.

16.

See Changes to “Public Charge” Inadmissibility Rule, supra note 12, at 3 (identifying several
“negative factors” and “heavily weighted negative factors” unrelated to government benefits, considered
to increase the likelihood of an applicant becoming a public charge).

17.

Id. at 1–2, 6.

18.

Id. Most immigrants are barred for a period of time, usually five years, from eligibility for many benefit
programs. Id. at 4; see also Nat’l Immigr. L. Ctr., Overview of Immigrant Eligibility for
Federal Programs (Jan. 2021), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/tbl1_ovrvw-fedpgms.pdf (displaying a table with eligibility requirements for major federal public assistance programs).
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obstacle in the path of immigrants with lesser financial resources to legalize their
status. Immigration advocates feared that in low-income, mixed-status households,
immigrant parents would disenroll their children with U.S. citizenship from food
security programs, like SNAP, for fear that the parents would be labeled a public
charge in future applications.19 This fear deprived many children of critical
government assistance.20
Soon after the issuance of this final rule on public charge assessments, multiple
states and immigrant rights organizations filed suit in federal courts across the
country.21 This temporarily arrested the Trump administration’s attempts to exclude
“persons likely to become a public charge” or to deny entry to immigrants who could
not prove they already had health insurance or the financial resources to cover any
medical costs. 22 Still, in January 2020, the Supreme Court allowed the DHS to
proceed with its implementation of the new public charge rule, 23 which went into
effect nationwide on February 24, 2020.24 Additionally, in early 2018, the U.S. State
Department, which controls visa issuance to intending immigrants outside the
United States, quietly implemented this new public charge rule by revising its Foreign
Affairs Manual.25
19.

Changes to “Public Charge” Inadmissibility Rule, supra note 12, at 4–5.

20. E.g., Samantha Artiga & Barbara Lyons, Kaiser Fam. Found., Family Consequences of

Detention/Deportation: Effects on Finances, Health, and Well-Being (Sept. 2018), http://
f iles.kff.org/attachment/Family-Consequences-of-Detention-Deportation-Effects-on-FinancesHealth-and-Well-Being (providing examples of how immigrant families, including children, were
negatively affected by the new public charge rule); Leila Miller, Trump Administration’s “Public Charge”
Rule Has Chilling Effect on Benefits for Immigrants’ Children, L.A. Times (Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.
latimes.com/california/story/2019-09-02/trump-children-benefits-public-charge-rule.

21.

See Deepti Hajela, Lawsuits Around U.S. Seek to Block Trump’s Public Charge Rule, PBS: News Hour
(Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/lawsuits-around-u-s-seek-to-block-trumpspublic-charge-rule; see also Ann E. Marimow, Court Sides with Trump Administration Effort to Impose
‘Public Charge’ Rule, Wash. Post (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/
block-on-trump-administration-public-charge-rule-lifted-by-court/2020/08/05/68f23426-d74f-11ea930e-d88518c57dcc_story.html.

22.

Hajela, supra note 21; see also Proclamation No. 9945, 84 Fed. Reg. 53991 (Oct. 4, 2019) (suspending
and limiting the entry of immigrants “who will financially burden the United States healthcare system”).
But see New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 408 F. Supp. 3d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (granting “a
nationwide injunction, as well as a stay postponing the effective date of the [Public Charge] Rule
pending a final ruling on the merits”); Make the Rd. N.Y. v. Cuccinelli, 419 F. Supp. 3d 647 (S.D.N.Y.
2019) (granting same).

23.

See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 600 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Today
the Court (rightly) grants a stay, allowing the government to pursue (for now) its [public charge] policy
everywhere save Illinois.”) (parenthesis in original).

24.

Public Charge, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-cardprocesses-and-procedures/public-charge (last updated Apr. 15, 2021).

25.

See Changes to “Public Charge” Instructions, supra note 5. Part of the Foreign Affairs Manual is
used by consular officers as guidance in adjudicating immigrant visa petitions at U.S. consulates and
embassies overseas. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual, 9 FAM 101.1–.2 (2020)
(noting that Chapter “9 [of] FAM is designed to be a comprehensive useful tool for consular officers” with
respect to visa applications, adjudications, and issuances). The immigration process for those living outside
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According to a March 2020 policy brief from the National Foundation for
American Policy, “[t]he number of visa refusals . . . for immigrants on public charge
grounds went from 1,076 in FY 2016 to 20,941 in FY 2019, an increase of 19,865 or
1,846%.”26 Additionally, during this same period, “immigrant visas issued by the
State Department declined by 25 [percent].”27 While the total number of applicants
for immigrant visas is unclear, there is no evidence to support the assertion that the
demand for immigrant visas has fallen, especially since there are increasing backlogs
of pending family-sponsored visa petitions—attributable to the policy changes
discussed herein. 28 This rise of immigrant visa denials based on public charge
grounds is a startling example of these policies’ impact on the lives of immigrant
families, which has garnered far too little public attention.
State program reports showed large declines in the number of immigrants
accessing public health insurance or other government entitlements, for fear of
negative repercussions and possible deportation.29 This is regardless of whether the
person’s immigration status would actually be impacted by the new public charge
the United States begins when U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents petition the State Department
on their behalf. See U.S. Citizen Petition for an Immediate Relative to Become a Lawful Permanent Resident,
U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., https://www.uscis.gov/forms/explore-my-options/us-citizenpetition-for-an-immediate-relative-to-become-a-lawful-permanent-resident (explaining that U.S. citizens
may only petition for certain “immediate relatives” to become a lawful permanent resident or to obtain an
immigrant visa); see also Green Card for Family Members of a Permanent Resident, U.S. Citizenship &
Immigr. Servs., https://www.uscis.gov/forms/explore-my-options/green-card-for-family-members-of-apermanent-resident#:~:text=To%20promote%20family%20unity%2C%20immigration,LPRs%20if%20
they%20are%20currently (last updated July 8, 2020) (explaining that U.S. lawful permanent residents are
only permitted to petition for “certain eligible family members” to obtain immigrant visas). U.S. citizens
may only petition for their spouse, unmarried child under twenty-one, or—if the U.S. citizen is twentyone years or older—their parent. U.S. Citizen Petition for an Immediate Relative to Become a Lawful
Permanent Resident, supra. Similarly, lawful permanent residents may only petition for their spouse,
unmarried children under twenty-one, and unmarried sons or daughters of any age. Green Card for Family
Members of a Permanent Resident, supra. Those seeking to immigrate through such familial relationships
need to show that they would not be a “public charge” as understood by the State Department in the
Foreign Affairs Manual. See Changes to “Public Charge” Instructions, supra note 5, at 2. If they
cannot, they could be denied a visa and prevented from reuniting with family members already in the
United States.
26. Nat’l Found. for Am. Pol’y, State Department Immigrant and Temporary Visa Declines

and Refusals in FY 2019, at 2 (March 2020), https://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/StateDepartment-Immigrant-and-Temporary-Visa-Declines-and-Refusals-in-FY-2019.NFAP-Policy-Brief.
March-2020.pdf. “The National Foundation for American Policy (NFAP) is a non-profit, non-partisan
organization dedicated to public policy research on trade, immigration, education, and other issues of
national importance.” Mission Statement, NFAP, https://nfap.com/about-us/mission-statement/ (last
visited Apr. 14, 2021).

27.

Nat’l Found. for Am. Pol’y, supra note 26, at 2, 4.

28. See id. at 4 (inferring that “the reason for the decline in immigrant visas [being issued] is due to changes in

administration policies” because although “there is no evidence [that] the demand has fallen for immigrant
visas,” there still are “large backlogs, including for processing, in family-sponsored preference categories”).

29. E.g., Leslie Berestein Rojas, Thousands of LA Immigrant Families Are No Longer Enrolled in Public Benefits.

A Pending Trump Rule Could Be Why, LAist (Aug. 2, 2019), https://laist.com/2019/08/02/thousands_of_
la_immigrant_families_are_no_longer_enrolled_in_public_benefits_a_pending_trump_rule_co.php.
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rule. 30 The widespread confusion and general misunderstanding of various
immigration statuses led to panic and fear.31
With the outbreak of the global COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020, the states of
New York and Illinois, as well as various immigrant rights organizations, petitioned
the Supreme Court to stay the implementation of the new public charge rule until
the health crisis had subsided. 32 In April 2020, the Supreme Court denied these
requests.33 However, at the end of July 2020, with the COVID-19 pandemic still
raging throughout the United States, the Southern District of New York granted an
injunction prohibiting the Trump administration from applying the new rule during
the pandemic.34 A little over a month later, in September 2020, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals allowed the DHS to resume implementation of the rule. 35
Eventually, on March 9, 2021, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
vacated the new public charge rule;36 nevertheless, its pernicious chilling effects—
especially in the form of noncitizens’ reluctance to access health resources and other
government services for fear of immigration repercussions—has persisted.37
The purpose of this essay is to debunk the notion that the Trump administration
followed historical precedent in creating a vastly more exclusionary public charge
rule and to assert that the over four hundred changes made to immigration law since
January 2017, whether currently in effect or not, separate immigrant families and
prevent low- and middle-income people from immigrating to the United States. In
30. Changes to “Public Charge” Inadmissibility Rule, supra note 12, at 3. For example, persons who

have been granted asylum in the United States or who have received immigration benefits as survivors
of domestic violence were statutorily exempt from this new rule. Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 212.23 (2019)
(listing all “categories of aliens” the public charge rule excludes). In addition, lawful permanent residents
are not impacted by the public charge rule. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.23.

31.

Miller, supra note 20; Changes to “Public Charge” Inadmissibility Rule, supra note 12, at 4.

32.

See Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Denies States’ Bid to Revisit Ruling on Trump’s ‘Wealth Test’ for Immigrants,
Wash. Post (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-courttrump-wealth-test-for-immigrants/2020/04/24/eccd18f6-8678-11ea-a3eb-e9fc93160703_story.html
(reporting that four states—New York, Connecticut, Illinois, and Vermont—asked the Supreme Court to
reconsider its decision from January 2020, which allowed the Trump administration to implement the
new public charge rule); see also Public Charge Rule Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic, Legal Council for
Health Just. (Apr. 17, 2020), https://legalcouncil.org/scotus-publiccharge-covid19/ (noting that the
Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, the Shriver Center, the Cook County State’s
Attorney, and Cook County joined New York, Connecticut and Vermont in petitioning the Supreme
Court “to temporarily suspend the . . . public charge rule in light of the public health crisis”).

33.

Barnes, supra note 32; Wolf v. Cook County, 140 S. Ct. 2709 (2020) (mem.) (denying the request for
stay without any explanation); Dep’t. of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 2709 (2020) (mem.)
(denying same).

34. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 475 F. Supp. 3d 208, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
35.

New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 974 F.3d 210, 216 (2d Cir. 2020) (granting the request to
stay the previously implemented preliminary injunction).

36. USCIS Pol’y Manual, ch.9 (U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. 2021), https://www.uscis.gov/

policy-manual/volume-8-part-g.

37.

See supra notes 6, 16, 19, 20, 26–31 and accompanying text.
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Part II of this essay, I briefly explore the history of public charge as a basis for
inadmissibility to the United States. Next, in Part III, I highlight a few of the over
four hundred changes to U.S. immigration law that the Trump administration made,
focusing on those that seek to criminalize, target, and exclude immigrant families.
In Part IV, I address how—despite federal court orders stopping some of these
changes, either temporarily or permanently—the “invisible wall” these changes
created instills fear in immigrant communities and results in consequences such as
disenrollment from healthcare insurance benefits and reluctance to engage in public
social services. I assert that in formulating a significantly more exclusionary definition
of public charge, the Trump administration sought to make it impossible for lowand middle-income individuals to immigrate to the United States through the family
visa process, thereby preventing ordinary people—much like my great-grandfather—
from starting a new life in the United States. Finally, in Part V, as we move into the
Biden administration, I posit that comprehensive immigration reform must rescind
this exclusionary definition of public charge in order to welcome newcomers with
dignity and create a fair and humane immigration system.
II. A HISTORY OF EXCLUSION: POOR LAWS TO KEEP OUT THE “HUDDLED MASSES”

U.S. immigration law has its roots in the British Poor Laws, imported to the
colonies and “transformed into laws to restrict the admission of particular foreigners
and deport them.”38 These laws mandated that impoverished people should be taken
care of in the towns or villages in which they had legally settled.39 Should they move
to somewhere they did not have legal settlement, they were unable to access any type
of aid and could also be expelled from the town or even from colonial America.40
Starting in the mid-to-late 1600s, the Massachusetts and New York colonies passed
their own poor laws, focused on returning transient beggars to “the country from
whence they came.”41 Colonial New York and Massachusetts were concerned with
protecting their towns’ treasuries from outsiders42 and their “respectable” townspeople
from newcomers.43

38. Hidetaka Hirota, Expelling the Poor: Atlantic Seaboard States & The 19th-Century

Origins of American Immigration Policy 43 (Oxford Univ. Press 2017). British poor law is “a
seventeenth-century set of poor laws that established each parish’s financial obligation to support the
local poor and its right to refuse to relieve the transient poor who did not belong to the parish.” Id. at 42.
Under the British poor law, “parishes [were permitted] to return wandering beggars back to their own
neighborhoods.” Id. at 42–43 (footnote omitted). See generally Kunal M. Parker, From Poor Law to
Immigration Law: Changing Visions of Territorial Community in Antebellum Massachusetts, 28 Hist.
Geography 61 (2000).

39.

Hirota, supra note 38; Parker, supra note 38, at 65.

40. Hirota, supra note 38.
41.

Id. See generally Edwards, Jr., supra note 3.

42.

Hirota, supra note 38, at 43–44.

43.

Id.
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Poor laws evolved into passenger control laws enacted by colonial governments in
New York and Massachusetts in 1683 and 1701, respectively.44 These laws strictly
regulated who was allowed to enter the colonies, with the express purpose of keeping
out those deemed to be “undesirable” for their lack of financial means.45 A century
later, after the Revolutionary War, the New York state legislature passed a law requiring
that ship captains report the names and occupations of all passengers to the mayor of
New York within twenty-four hours of landing.46 That law of the late 1780s required
surety bonds to be paid for passengers who seemed to be without sufficient income or
likely to become a pauper.47 Inspecting officers at U.S. seaports had a great deal of
discretion to categorize certain individuals as “destitute” and others as “able-bodied,”
resulting in the expulsions of the former with little oversight.48
Anti-immigrant and nativist sentiment against poor Irish Catholics fostered the
growth of exclusionary state immigration policy in the mid-to-late 1800s.49 At the
same time, the nativist movement was becoming more popular,50 further affecting
the development of U.S. immigration law.51 Even before the potato famine in Ireland
during the 1840s,52 prejudice against Catholic newcomers was brewing.53 Anti-Irish
and anti-Catholic mobs set fire to churches in Philadelphia in 1844, and conspiracy
44. Id. at 46.
45.

See id. at 46–47 (summarizing the passenger control laws in Massachusetts and New York).

46. Id. at 46.
47.

Id. Under this law, ship captains were required to either bring the passenger “back to the place of
embarkation within one month” or “provide to the mayor . . . a bond of 100£ with surety that the person
would not become a public charge.” Id. at 46–47.

48. See id. at 3 (noting that “[s]tate officials enjoyed sweeping powers” to exclude foreigners “with mental

and physical defects, such as ‘lunatics,’ ‘idiots,’ and ‘infirm persons[]’” although “[i]nsanity and infirmity
. . . were never well-defined or self-evident conditions, but always subject to f luid and arbitrary
interpretations by those who diagnosed them”).

49. See id. at 3–4 (“[I]t was Irish poverty that generated the principal momentum for the growth of state

immigration policy. No other coastal state engaged in passenger control with the same level of legislative
effort and success as New York and Massachusetts, the major receiving states for Irish immigration.”).
Scholars such as Professor Hidetaka Hirota assert that, while these laws excluded poor immigrants of
every background, strong cultural and religious prejudice against the Irish Catholics drove these laws’
adoption and growth. See id. at 206.

50. See generally Lorraine Boissoneault, How the 19th-Century Know Nothing Party Reshaped American

Politics, Smithsonian Mag. (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/immigrantsconspiracies-and-secret-society-launched-american-nativism-180961915/.

51.

Id. (explaining that the nativists “focus[ed] all their energy on the immigrant question” because “[t]hey
wanted to restore their vision of what America should look like with temperance, Protestantism, selfreliance, with American nationality and work ethic enshrined as the nation’s highest values”).

52.

See generally Hirota, supra note 38, at 22–28 (exploring Irish immigration to the U.S. before and after
the potato famine).

53.

See Christopher Klein, When America Despised the Irish: The 19th Century’s Refugee Crisis, History:
History Stories (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.history.com/news/when-america-despised-the-irishthe-19th-centurys-refugee-crisis (last updated Mar. 14, 2019) (providing examples of conflicts arising
between Protestants and Catholics before the Ireland potato famine).
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theories surrounding Catholic religious rituals abounded.54 The nativist movement
stoked fear in people living in Atlantic coastal cities that foreigners—like the
Irish—were trying to “steal” elections and gain favor with politicians.55 Nativists
also exploited the stereotype that the Irish immigrants were “immoral drunkards”
and used the Irish as scapegoats for social ills such as crime and poverty.56 In the
1840s and 1850s, nativist sentiment spread beyond the coastal areas to major cities
such as Chicago, Cincinnati, and Louisville.57
As the famine began in Ireland, American cities saw their populations greatly
increase—approximately thirty-seven thousand Irish entered Boston in 1847, a city of
only 115,000.58 A majority of these immigrants were destitute and suffered from
malnutrition, exacerbated by the ocean voyage.59 Once here, they took on low-paying
and often dangerous jobs—the jobs that no one else wanted.60 Newspaper advertisements
for desirable job openings at the time emphasized that “No Irish Need Apply.”61
In New York City in 1849, a secret society formed under the name “Order of the
Star-Spangled Banner.”62 Its members were not open about their activities and, when
asked, would respond: “I know nothing.”63 Its membership grew and the society
became a political party, the Know Nothing party, in 1850.64 The party was staunchly

54. Id.
55.

Amy Briggs, The Know-Nothings: The United States’ First Anti-Immigration Party, Nat’l Geographic
(Nov. 2018), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/magazine/2017/07-08/know-nothings-andnativism/.

56. Id.; see also Josh Zeitz, When America Hated Catholics, POLITICO Mag. (Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.

politico.com/magazine/story/2015/09/when-america-hated-catholics-213177.

57.

Briggs, supra note 55.

58. Irish Potato Famine: Gone to America, The Hist. Place, https://www.historyplace.com/worldhistory/

famine/america.htm#:~:text=Throughout%20the%20Famine%20years%2C%2075,53%2C000%20
also%20arrived%20in%201847 (last visited Apr. 14, 2021).

59.

See Klein, supra note 53 (describing the conditions that the Irish immigrants faced while sailing to
America).

60. See Joining the Workforce, Libr. of Cong., https://www.loc.gov/classroom-materials/immigration/irish/

joining-the-workforce/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2021) (“Irish immigrants often entered the workforce at the
bottom of the occupational ladder and took on the menial and dangerous jobs that were often avoided by
other workers.”).

61.

Klein, supra note 53.

62. Briggs, supra note 55.
63. Id.
64. Boissoneault, supra note 50. The Know Nothing party—originally called the American party—arose

from the nativist movement, which began in the mid-nineteenth century and was “the American
political system’s first major third party.” Id.; Uri Friedman, What Is a Nativist?, The Atlantic (Apr.
11, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/what-is-nativist-trump/521355/.
The Know Nothing party was a “pureblooded pedigree of Protestant Anglo-Saxon stock” that “reject[ed]
all Catholics,” Boissoneault, supra note 50, and “portrayed Catholic immigration from countries such as
Germany and Ireland as a grave threat to Protestant-born Americans.” Friedman, supra.
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anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic.65 Its members were mainly working-class men,
opposed to elitism.66 They encouraged racist, anti-immigrant tropes against the Irish
to incite further fear toward recently arrived immigrants.67 The Know Nothing party
enjoyed political success for a short time, but eventually suffered from a lack of
central organization.68 Nevertheless, the anti-immigrant and anti-poor platform,
combined with messages of hate and prejudice, had a profound influence in the
shaping of immigration law at both state and federal levels.
Following the Supreme Court decisions in 1849 and 1875 declaring state passenger
laws unconstitutional,69 New York and Massachusetts pushed for the formation of
federal immigration policy to keep out the poor.70 In 1882, Congress created the first
Immigration Act, building on the exclusionary policies already implemented by New
York and Massachusetts.71 Passed the same year as the Chinese Exclusion Act,72 these
laws prohibited “any convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person unable to take care of himself
or herself without becoming a public charge”73 from immigrating to the United States.74
65.

See Michael Todd Landis, How the Know Nothing Party Turned Nativism Into a Political Strategy,
Zocalo Pub. Square (July 12, 2018), https://www.zocalopublicsquare.org/2018/07/12/know-nothingparty-turned-nativism-political-strategy/ideas/essay/.

66. See Briggs, supra note 55 (“Party members tended to come from the working classes and had a strong

anti-elitist bent.”).

67.

See id. (“Their platform sought to limit immigration and the influence of Catholicism, and they used
ugly ethnic stereotypes to stir up hatred against the recent . . . Irish arrivals.”).

68. See id. (“Before 1855, the Know-Nothings had no centralized organization. Encouraged by their

successes, they formally organized in 1855 . . . , after which they went into a rapid decline.”).

69. See generally Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875) (holding that the New York state

passenger law effectively taxing foreign passengers was unconstitutional because “this whole subject has
been confided to [U.S.] Congress”); Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283 (1849) (holding that the New York
state passenger law imposing “a tax on passengers of a ship from a foreign port” was unconstitutional
because such law was “a regulation of foreign commerce,” which resides solely with the U.S. Congress).

70. See Hirota, supra note 38, at 4–5 (“Officials in both New York and Massachusetts fundamentally

influenced the development of national immigration policy in the late nineteenth century by playing a
central role in the making of the federal Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.”); see also Emma Green, First,
They Excluded the Irish, The Atlantic, (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2017/02/trump-poor-immigrants-public-charge/515397/ (“In the 1870s, when the U.S. Supreme
Court declared some of the state passenger laws unconstitutional, [New York and Massachusetts] started
a campaign to transform their state laws into federal laws. The result was America’s first national
immigration laws.”).

71.

See Hirota, supra note 38, at 4–5; see also Torrie Hester et al., Now the Trump Administration is Trying to
Punish Legal Immigrants for Being Poor, Wash. Post (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/made-by-history/wp/2018/08/09/now-the-trump-administration-is-trying-to-punish-legalimmigrants-for-being-poor/ (describing the poor laws as “proto-immigration laws for individual states”
and explaining that such laws “provided a framework for the first federal immigration laws”).

72. Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943).
73. Immigration Act of 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214, 214, amended by Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551,

26 Stat. 1084.

74.

Public Charge Provisions of Immigration Law: A Brief Historical Background, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr.
Servs., https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/our-history/history-office-and-library/our-history/public-charge-
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In 1891, Congress revised the 1882 Immigration Act and clarified that “[a]ll . . .
persons likely to become a public charge” were not allowed to enter.75
In 1903, the exclusionary laws evolved to include deportability provisions.76
Foreign nationals who became a public charge up to two years after their arrival in
the United States could now be deported.77 In fact, five federal immigration laws
passed between 1882 and 1917 provided grounds for exclusion or deportation on the
basis of poverty, mental and physical health status, morality, or political beliefs.78
“Paupers and persons likely to become a public charge . . . accounted for the majority
of exclusions and deportations” during this time.79
By the latter half of the twentieth century, public charge regulations appeared in
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 and in the amendments that followed
in 1965.80 This codification provided statutory authority to exclude those likely to
become a public charge from entering the United States,81 and to deport those who
become a public charge within five years of entry.82 The “public charge” concept was
clarified to mean total dependence on public support.83 If a person was institutionalized
provisions-of-immigration-law-a-brief-historical-background (last updated Aug. 14, 2019) [hereinafter
Public Charge: A Brief Historical Background].
75. Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084, 1084.
76. See generally Immigration Act of 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213.
77.

Id. § 20.

78. Immigration Act of 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214 (excluding “any person unable to take care of himself or

herself without becoming a public charge”); Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, 22 Stat. 1084 (excluding
“paupers or persons likely to become a public charge”); Immigration Act of 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat.
1213 (excluding, among others, “idiots, insane persons, epileptics, . . . professional beggars; . . . persons
who have been convicted of a felony . . . ; polygamists, anarchists, . . . [and] prostitutes”); Immigration
Act of 1907, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898 (excluding immigrants with a “mental or physical defect being of a
nature which may affect the ability of such an alien to earn a living”); Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29,
39 Stat. 874 (excluding “persons with chronic alcoholism” and “vagrants”). See generally Public Charge: A
Brief Historical Background, supra note 74.

79. Torrie Hester et al., Historians’ Comment: DHS Notice of Proposed Rule “Inadmissibility on Public Charge

Grounds”, Immigr. L. Ctr. of Minn. 3 (Oct. 5, 2018) (footnote omitted), https://www.ilcm.org/
wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Historians-comment-FR-2018-21106.pdf. Nevertheless, enforcement of
these provisions was uneven. Id. Biases and stereotypes often prevailed against women as well as
disfavored ethnic and racial groups, and certainly against the disabled. Id. at 2–3. Effectively, anyone not
entering the United States as or with an able-bodied white man was at risk of deportation. See id. at 9
(recognizing that the public charge policy is based on the principle that the United States desires
“immigrants who are able-bodied and employable, capable of supporting themselves and their families”).

80. See Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act, Pub. L. No. 82–414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)

(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.), amended by Immigration and Nationality Act of
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).

81.

Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82–414, § 212(a)(15), 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(2013)).

82. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(8) (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(5)

(2008)).

83. See Medha D. Makhlouf, The Public Charge Rule as Public Health Policy, 16 Ind. Health L. Rev. 177, 185

(2019) (noting that the analyses for public charge deportability and inadmissibility both focus on whether
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in locales—including poor houses, asylums for the mentally ill, hospitals, or prisons—
they could only be deported as a public charge if their case was brought within the
five-year timeframe and if it could be shown that the causes for the institutionalization
existed prior to entry.84
In 1996, Congress significantly changed immigration policy with the enactment
of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).85
Changes introduced with IIRIRA are too numerous to fully detail,86 but notably
include expedited removal, which provides that certain non-citizens deemed
inadmissible by an immigration officer may be deported without further
administrative hearings or review.87 Also enacted in 1996, the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) 88 sought to reduce
dependence upon Public Assistance, SNAP, and Medicaid, by creating employment
requirements to increase workforce participation.89 For immigrants and their families,
Title IV of the PRWORA created a “qualified alien” category that divided noncitizens into various groups based on their immigration status.90 These divisions can
the noncitizen “will use certain public benefits that indicate total, or near-total dependence on the
government”); see also Quinn & Kinoshita, supra note 11 (“[T]he public charge ground of inadmissibility
was triggered if the government determined the individual was likely to become primarily dependent on
the government for subsistence, as demonstrated by either the receipt of public cash assistance for income
maintenance or institutionalization for long-term care at government expense.”).
84. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(3)–(4) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)

(2008)).

85. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat.

3009–546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (amending the 1952 Immigration and
Nationality Act); see David M. Grable, Note, Personhood Under the Due Process Clause: A Constitutional
Analysis of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 83 Cornell L. Rev.
820, 821 (1998) (describing IIRIRA as “‘the most diverse, divisive and draconian immigration law
enacted since the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882,’” focused on “stemming the tide of illegal immigration”
to the United States).

86. See generally Dara Lind, The Disastrous, Forgotten 1996 Law That Created Today’s Immigration Problem, Vox

(Apr. 28, 2016), https://www.vox.com/2016/4/28/11515132/iirira-clinton-immigration (describing
IIRIRA as “a bundle of provisions with a single goal: to increase penalties on immigrants who had violated
US law in some way” and detailing “some of [the immigration experts’] most significant complaints”).

87.

See Immigration and Nationality Act, § 235(b) (providing that any noncitizen deemed inadmissible by
an examining immigration officer “shall be detained for further inquiry to be conducted by a special
inquiry officer”), amended by Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
§ 302(a) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (2008)).

88. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (Welfare Reform Act), Pub. L. No.

104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).

89. See The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act in the US, Ctr. for Pub.

Impact (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/case-study/personal-responsibility-andwork-opportunity-reconciliation-act-the-clinton-welfare-reform/ (noting that two of the objectives behind
PRWORA were to “provide assistance to needy families” and to “end the dependence of needy parents on
government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage”) (internal quotations omitted).

90. PRWORA §§ 400, 431 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1641(b) (2008); Claire R. Thomas &

Ernie Collette, Unaccompanied and Excluded from Food Security: A Call for the Inclusion of Immigrant Youth
Twenty Years after Welfare Reform, 31 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 197, 206 (2017).
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delay or otherwise restrict immigrant access to public benefits, and render such access
more dependent upon obtaining U.S. citizenship.91 As a result of PRWORA, a nondisabled adult typically must wait a minimum of five years from the immigration
status approval date to receive SNAP benefits.92 Under these 1996 changes, many
immigrants, if not most, are ineligible for any type of federal public benefit.93 Some
states, including New York, are more generous and allow immigrants to receive
Medicaid,94 cash assistance, and other benefits.95
III. ADMINISTRATIVE ASSAULTS ON IMMIGRATION IN THE TRUMP ERA

The Trump administration commenced its efforts to curtail immigration shortly
after taking office in January 2017.96 The first of three travel bans introduced by
President Donald Trump was aimed at preventing all persons from seven majority91.

See Thomas & Collette, supra note 90, at 206–07; see also Amanda Levinson, Immigrants and Welfare
Use, Migration Pol’y Inst. (Aug. 1, 2002), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigrants-andwelfare-use (outlining how immigration status affects whether and when an individual will receive
public benefits).

92.

See PRWORA § 403 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1613 (2020)). Importantly, while subsequent
laws restored pre-PRWORA SNAP eligibility to all minor immigrant children, disabled immigrants,
and elderly immigrants who resided in the United States prior to the effective date of PRWORA
(August 22, 1996) and who were otherwise in a “qualified alien” category, current SNAP eligibility still
depends upon the immigrant’s date of entry into the United States and the type of humanitarian relief
the applicant applied for at the time of entry or shortly thereafter. Id. §§ 401–03 (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611–13 (2020)); Audrey Singer, Welfare Reform and Immigrants: A Policy Review, in
Immigrants, Welfare Reform, and the Poverty of Policy 21, 27–28 (Philip Kretsedemas & Ana
Aparicio eds., West Ct: Praeger Publishers) (2004)).

93.

Thomas & Collette, supra note 90, at 205–06.

94. See Nat’l Immigr. L. Ctr., Medical Assistance Programs for Immigrants in Various States

(Jan. 2021), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/med-services-for-imms-in-states.pdf
(outlining immigrant eligibility for Medicaid by state).

95. See Karina Fortuny & Ajay Chaudry, Urban Inst., A Comprehensive Review of Immigrant

Access to Health and Human Services 10–17 (2011), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/
publication/27651/412425-A-Comprehensive-Review-of-Immigrant-Access-to-Health-and-HumanServices.PDF (discussing “state-only-funded programs,” including cash assistance, health coverage, and
food assistance, and the eligibility requirements in each state). Only some states offer state-financed
cash assistance to persons who would not be eligible for federally-funded cash benefits due to their
immigration status. See generally Nat’l Immigr. L. Ctr., State-Funded TANF Replacement
Programs (Apr. 2020), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/tbl8_state-tanf.pdf
(providing a list of state-funded programs that provide cash assistance to immigrants ineligible for the
federal cash assistance program); see also PEW Charitable Trusts, Mapping Public Benefits for
Immigrants in the States (Sept. 2014), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2014/09/
mappingpublicbenefitsforimmigrantsinthestatesfinal.pdf (discussing the federal- and state-funded
programs available to immigrants).

96. Jeremy Diamond, Trump Orders Construction of Border Wall, Boosts Deportation Force, CNN, https://

www.cnn.com/2017/01/25/politics/donald-trump-build-wall-immigration-executive-orders/index.
html (last updated Jan. 25, 2017) (reporting that shortly after Trump was inaugurated, he “signed two
executive orders directing the construction of a wall on the US-Mexico border, boosting border patrol
forces and increasing the number of immigration enforcement officers”).
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Muslim countries from traveling to the United States.97 The chaos of this first
executive order, felt at U.S. airports nationwide, resulted in detentions of travelers,
widespread protests, the provisional revocation of sixty thousand visas,98 two
additional attempts to rewrite the order, and—finally—a Supreme Court challenge.99
The Trump administration proposed and implemented over four hundred
changes to immigration law through executive actions, policy changes, and statutory
and regulatory changes, all aimed at preventing persons of various immigration
status from immigrating to the United States.100 Few of these policies have generated
as widespread outrage as the initial travel ban, but all have had wide-ranging impacts
on immigrant families. There are too many of them to list in this essay, however,
some are summarized below.
Even though the right to apply for asylum is enshrined in both U.S. and
international law,101 the Trump administration repeatedly referred to asylum as a
97.

See Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, Exec. Order 13769, 82 Fed.
Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) (suspending the entry of “immigrants and nonimmigrants . . . from countries
referred to in section 217(a)(12) of the [Immigration and Nationality Act]”); see also Alison Siskin, President
Trump’s Executive Order on Suspending Entry of Select Foreign Nationals: The Seven Countries, CRS Insight
(Feb. 1, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/IN10642.pdf (noting that “citizens of Iran, Iraq, Libya,
Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen” were barred from entering the United States under Executive Order
3769 even though the order “d[id] not specifically mention the seven countries”).

98. See Rebecca Hersher, Federal Judge Stays Trump Travel Order, But Many Visas Already Revoked, NPR:

The Two-Way (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/02/03/513306413/statedepartment-says-fewer-than-60-000-visas-revoked-under-travel-order (last updated Feb. 4, 2017)
(reporting traveler detention and revocation of visas due to the travel ban); see also Nathan Heller, The
Promise of J.F.K.: The Place Where America Meets the World, The New Yorker (Jan. 29, 2017), https://
www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-promise-of-j-f-k-the-place-where-america-meets-the-world
(reporting widespread protests against the travel ban at large airports).

99. See Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, Exec. Order No. 13780, 82

Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017) (replacing Executive Order No. 13769 and amending the list of countries
included in the travel ban); see also Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted
Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats, Proclamation No. 9645, 85
Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 27, 2017) (reinforcing the travel ban and adding new countries to the list “to protect
[the United States] from terrorist attacks and other public-safety threats”). But see Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.
Ct. 2392 (2018) (addressing plaintiffs’ claims that the travel ban “contravenes provisions in the Immigration
and Nationality Act” and “violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment”).

100. See generally Sarah Pierce, Migration Pol’y Inst., Immigration-Related Policy Changes in

the First Two Years of the Trump Administration passim (2019), https://www.migrationpolicy.
org/sites/default/files/publications/ImmigrationChangesTrumpAdministration-FinalWEB.pdf. The
various immigration statuses included business, family, and humanitarian. Id.

101. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 187 U.N.T.S. 137, 154 (entered into

force Apr. 22, 1954), https://www.refworld.org/docid/3be01b964.html (recommending “that
Governments continue to receive refugees in their territories” and work towards finding these refugees
“asylum and the possibility of resettlement”); see also Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1,
Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 268–70 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967), https://www.refworld.org/
docid/3ae6b3ae4.html (disregarding the date of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and
expanding the 1951 recommendation to provide asylum to all refugees). As a signatory to the 1967 U.N.
Protocol, and through the domestic incorporation into U.S. immigration law, the United States has
legal obligations to provide protection to those who qualify as refugees. Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees, supra; see also Brian D. Lepard, Violating International Law Through Onerous Procedural
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“loophole.”102 The administration went to great lengths to block access to the asylum
process and prevent asylum-seekers from entering the country while their applications
were pending.103 First, the administration’s unofficial policy of “metering” required
those seeking asylum at the U.S. border with Mexico to put their name on an
unofficial waiting list.104 They were “guaranteed a lengthy wait” before the
opportunity to see a judge in Immigration Court or attend a Credible Fear Interview
with a U.S. government official.105 Second, the administration’s Migrant Protection
Protocols (MPP) sent individuals and families seeking asylum at the southern border
back to Mexico, between their appearances in U.S. Immigration Courts.106 A study
found that almost fifty thousand asylum-seekers were impacted by the MPP in its
first year of operation, and only 0.1 percent of the approximately ten thousand
completed cases were granted asylum as of September 2019.107 Third, due to the
Law, Völkerrechtsblog (Aug. 18, 2020), https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/de/violating-internationallaw-through-onerous-procedural-law/ (discussing the evolution of U.S. immigration law and the
obligations to protect refugees). Congress incorporated the definition of a refugee from the 1951 U.N.
Convention into U.S. immigration law in the Refugee Act of 1980. Compare Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees, supra, at 152, with Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201, 94 Stat. 102
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
102. E.g., President Donald J. Trump is Working to Stop the Abuse of Our Asylum System and Address the Root

Causes of the Border Crisis, The White House (Apr. 29, 2019), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/
briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-working-stop-abuse-asylum-system-address-rootcauses-border-crisis/ (“The biggest loophole drawing illegal aliens to our borders is the use of fraudulent
or meritless asylum claims to gain entry into our great country.”).

103. See Bill Frelick, The Trump Administration’s Final Insult and Injury to Refugees, Hum. Rts. Watch (Dec.

11, 2020), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/11/trump-administrations-final-insult-and-injuryrefugees (recognizing that the new rule “sets bars that will make it exceedingly difficult for all people
who deserve asylum to be recognized as refugees and protected”); see also Press Release, Hum. Rts.
First, Rule to Block Asylum Seekers from Protection Finalized in Last Days of Trump Administration
(Dec. 15, 2020) (on file with author) (explaining the “insurmountable barriers” asylum-seekers must
overcome for their asylum applications to be approved).

104. NPR Weekend Edition Saturday, ‘Metering At The Border, NPR, at 8:03 (June 29, 2019), https://www.

npr.org/2019/06/29/737268856/metering-at-the-border.

105. Ashoka Mukpo, Asylum-Seekers Stranded in Mexico Face Homelessness, Kidnapping, and Sexual Violence,

ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/immigrants-rights/immigrants-rights-and-detention/asylumseekers-stranded-mexico-face (last visited Apr. 14, 2021). A Credible Fear Interview is the first step in
the defensive asylum process for those who would be subject to expedited removal because they seek to
enter the United States without a visa or other admission paperwork. See Immigration and Nationality
Act (McCarran-Walter Act), Pub. L. No. 82–414, ch. 477, § 235(b), 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (2008)) (providing the asylum application process).

106. Migrant Protection Protocols, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. ( Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/

news/2019/01/24/migrant-protection-protocols. “The Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) are a U.S.
Government action whereby certain foreign individuals entering or seeking admission to the U.S. from
Mexico—illegally or without proper documentation—may be returned to Mexico and wait outside of
the U.S. for the duration of their immigration proceedings, where Mexico will provide them with all
appropriate humanitarian protections for the duration of their stay.” See generally id.

107. Gustavo Solis, Remain in Mexico Has a 0.1 Percent Asylum Grant Rate, San Diego Union-Trib. (Dec.

15, 2019), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/border-baja-california/story/2019-12-15/
remain-in-mexico-has-a-0-01-percent-asylum-grant-rate.
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COVID-19 pandemic, the Trump administration discontinued Immigration Court
appearances for asylum-seekers waiting in Mexico indefinitely.108 While other
Immigration Courts in the United States conducted hearings remotely, those waiting
per the MPP did not have their court dates rescheduled.109
Additionally, in June 2020, the DHS and the Department of Justice proposed
new regulations that sought to dramatically change asylum eligibility.110 With only a
thirty-day public comments period, the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was over 160
pages long, with more than sixty of those pages the proposed regulations themselves.111
The regulations included “dense, technical language and sweeping new restrictions”112

108. Jasmine Aguilera, Migrants Stranded in Mexico Have 1 Year to File for Asylum. COVID-19 Is Making That

Deadline Nearly Impossible, Time (Sept. 25, 2020), https://time.com/5888791/covid-19-asylum-seekersmexico/.

109. Camilo Montoya-Galvez, U.S. Postpones Court Hearings for Asylum-Seekers in Mexcio Over Coronavirus,

CBS News (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-postpones-court-hearings-for-asylumseekers-in-mexico-over-coronavirus/. During the first week of the Biden administration, the DHS issued
a statement suspending any new entrants in the MPP program. Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
DHS Statement on the Suspension of New Enrollments in the Migrant Protection Protocols Program
(Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2021/01/20/dhs-statement-suspension-new-enrollmentsmigrant-protection-protocols-program#:~:text=Protection%20Protocols%20Program-,DHS%20
Statement %20on%20the%20Suspension%20of %20New,the%20Migrant %20Protection%20
Protocols%20Program& text=Today %2C%20DHS%20is%20announcing %20the,adding %20
individuals%20into%20the%20program. The following month, virtual processing of individuals with
pending cases under the MPP program resumed, but new applicants are not considered, creating yet
another barrier to accessing asylum protections. Press Release, The White House, The MPP Program
and Border Security Joint Statement (Feb. 16, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
statements-releases/2021/02/16/the-mpp-program-and-border-security-joint-statement-by-assistant-tothe-president-and-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-and-assistant-to-the-president-andhomeland-security-advisor-and-deputy-na/.

110. Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Review, 85

Fed. Reg. 26264 (proposed June 15, 2020) (to be codified in scattered parts of 8 CFR); see also Press
Release, Dep’t of Justice, The Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security
Propose Rule on Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal (June 10, 2020), https://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-and-department-homeland-security-propose-rule-proceduresasylum-and (detailing the proposed changes). The Department of Justice controls the Immigration
Courts and Board of Immigration Appeals. See About the Office, U.S. Dep’t of Just.: Exec. Off. For
Immigr. Rev., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office (last updated Feb. 3, 2021).

111. See, e.g., Proposed Changes to the Asylum Regulations, African Advoc. Network (July 15, 2020), https://

www.aansf.org/news/2020/12/7/proposed-changes-to-the-asylum-regulations (arguing that “[t]he
sheer quantity of pages to review and the wide array of substantive changes [the regulations] alter are
reason enough for a longer period for comments to be submitted”). See generally Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable
Fear Review (June 4, 2020), https://s3.amazonaws.com/public-inspection.federalregister.gov/202012575.pdf?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery (containing the official 161-page document
releasing the proposed rule prior to its official publication in the Federal Register).

112. Ctr. for L. and Soc. Pol’y, Comment Letter on Proposed Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of

Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Review (July 15, 2020), https://www.clasp.org/sites/
default/files/publications/2020/07/CLASP%20Public%20Comment%207.15.20.pdf.
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that upended established principles of international human rights law113 and severely
limited who can apply for asylum in the United States.114 For example, the proposed
§ 1208.13(e) would have allowed immigration judges to deny asylum without a
hearing or a chance to testify if the judges determine, on their initiative or at the
request of a DHS attorney, that the application form does not adequately make a
claim.115 This radical change would have permitted judges to “pretermit” asylum
claims, which would be extremely problematic, especially for those who do not have
an attorney or do not read and write in English, and are thus at risk of filing an
inadequate application even though they may have a valid claim.116
The Trump administration’s attacks on immigrant youth were relentless. In
September 2017, the DHS published a memorandum rescinding the Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, which allowed for certain immigrant
youth to apply for a work permit and granted them protection from deportation for
renewable periods of two years.117 The recission of the two-year protection for those
who already had it under DACA was stayed by a federal court, but the court did not
stay the ban on new DACA applications for otherwise eligible immigrant youth.118
In June 2020, the Supreme Court found that the termination of DACA was arbitrary
and capricious.119 Nevertheless, the Trump administration disavowed the Supreme
Court’s decision and continued to reject initial DACA applications, leaving
immigrant youth in limbo.120 A further lawsuit in the Eastern District of New York
113. See Lepard, supra note 101 (“These far-reaching changes would violate the United States’ international

legal obligations.”).

114. Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Review, 85

Fed. Reg. 26264.

115. Id. at 36277.
116. Id.; see also Proposed Changes to the Asylum Regulations, supra note 111 (“Our organization has witnessed

that our community suffers from a lack of access to resources, literacy, and extreme language barriers,
which impede their ability to understand fully the complex nature of our immigration system.”).

117. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Memorandum on Rescission of Deferred Action for Childhood

Arrivals (2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum-rescission-daca. See generally
Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs.,
https://www.uscis.gov/archive/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca (last updated
Feb. 4, 2021) (explaining the DACA policy and providing the requirements for requesting DACA).

118. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 298 F. Supp. 3d 1304 (N.D. Cal. 2018);

Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of
Colored People v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209 (2018). These district court orders required DHS to “accept
DACA applications from people who have or previously had DACA” but did not require DHS to accept
new DACA applications. See Nat’l Immigr. L. Ctr., Litigation Related to Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) 1 (Jan. 2021), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/
litigation-re-DACA-2019.pdf (discussing litigation surrounding the recission of DACA).

119. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1913, 1915 (2020).
120. See Memorandum from Chad F. Wolf, Acting Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., on changes to the DACA

policy to Mark Morgan, Senior Off. Performing the Duties of Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border
Protection, Matthew Albence, Senior Off. Performing the Duties of Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs
Enf ’t, & Joseph Edlow, Deputy Dir. of Pol’y, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. (July 28, 2020),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/20_0728_s1_daca-reconsideration-memo.pdf
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concluded in the Trump administration’s begrudging reinstatement of DACA in
December 2020.121 On the day of his inauguration, President Joe Biden issued an
executive order calling for the DHS to “preserve and fortify” DACA protections.122
For children in federal immigration custody, the Trump administration repeatedly
sought to upend a longstanding legal settlement agreement, referred to as the Flores
Agreement, which governs the minimal conditions for the detention of minors.123 In
addition, beginning in July of 2017, the Trump administration separated more than
five thousand immigrant children from their parents as part of its “zero tolerance”
policy for asylum-seeking families who entered the United States without authorization
rather than waiting for months on a metering list in violent Mexican border cities.124
(ordering the continuance of rejecting initial DACA applications) [hereinafter Wolf Memorandum]; see
also Betty Márquez Rosales, Many Undocumented Youth Remain in Limbo After Supreme Court’s DACA
Decision, EdSource ( July 13, 2020), https://edsource.org/2020/undocumented-youth-remain-inlimbo-after-supreme-courts-daca-decision/635447.
121. See Vidal v. Wolf, No. 16-CV-4756 (NGG) (VMS), 2020 WL 7121849, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2020)

(vacating the Wolf Memorandum from July 2020 because “Mr. Wolf was without lawful authority”
when he issued it, reinstating the DACA program back to “its terms as they existed prior to the
attempted rescission,” and ordering additional relief and compliance against DHS); see supra note 120
and accompanying text; see also Update: Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, U.S. Citizenship &
Immigr. Servs., https://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/deferred-action-for-childhood-arrivals-responseto-december-4-2020-order-in-batalla-vidal-et-al-v (last updated Dec. 9, 2020) (announcing the
reinstatement of DACA “pursuant to an order” and noting that “DHS may seek relief from the order”).
The Eastern District of New York reinstated the DACA program in November 2020 and ordered the
parties to a conference to determine the appropriate relief for the unlawful Wolf Memorandum, which
took place in December 2020. Vidal v. Wolf, No. 16-CV-4756 (NGG) (VMS), 2020 WL 6695076
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2020); see also Batalla Vidal v. Wolf and State of New York v. Trump, DHS (Dec. 7,
2020), https://www.dhs.gov/publication/batalla-vidal-et-al-v-wolf-et-al-and-state-new-york-et-al-vtrump-et-al (last updated Jan. 15, 2021) (announcing reinstatement of the DACA program as a result of
the lawsuits filed after the Wolf Memorandum).

122. Memorandum of January 20, 2021 on Preserving and Fortifying Deferred Action for Childhood

Arrivals (DACA), 86 Fed. Reg. 7053 (Jan 25, 2021). On March 26, 2021, the Biden administration
announced a plan to issue a rule that protects DACA from a pending court challenge. Camilo MontoyaGalvez, Biden Administration Moves to Safeguard DACA Program for “Dreamers” as Court Ruling Looms,
CBS News (Mar. 26, 2021), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/biden-administration-to-shore-up-dacaprogram-for-dreamers-as-court-ruling-looms/.

123. See Jonathan Blitzer, The Trump Administration’s Sustained Attack on the Rights of Immigrant Children, The

New Yorker (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-trump-administrationssustained-attack-on-flores-agreement-rights-of-immigrant-children (“The Trump Administration has,
from the start, attacked Flores as a ‘loophole’ that immigrant families have continually sought to exploit
. . . .”). The Flores Agreement, a result of Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993), “established minimum
standards and conditions for housing and release of juveniles in [Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS)] custody” and applies to all unaccompanied noncitizen children in such government custody. Maria
Theresa Baldini-Potermin, Immigration Trial Handbook § 4:5 (Apr. 2019). Requirements of the
Flores Agreement include “access to food and medical care” and “promis[ing] to detain [the children] for
the shortest possible amount of time, in the ‘least restrictive’ settings.” Blitzer, supra.

124. Associated Press, More Than 5,400 Children Split at Border, According to New Count, CBS News:

Immigr. & The Border (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/more-5-400children-split-border-according-new-count-n1071791 (reporting that 5,460 children were separated
between July 2017 and October 2019). See generally Family Separation Under the Trump Administration –
A Timeline, S. Poverty L. Ctr. ( June 17, 2020), https://www.splcenter.org/news/2020/06/17/

215

THE INVISIBLE WALL

N

Years later, many of these children remain separated from their deported parents,
some of whom cannot even be located.125
In May 2019, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
“published a proposed rule that would bar [low-income] ‘mixed-status’ families from
residing in public housing and using Section 8 programs.” 126 Additionally, if
implemented, this proposed rule would impose immigration status checks and
verification requirements on all household members.127 Consequently, “mixed-status
households would have to make the impossible choice between splitting their families
apart or being evicted from their homes” within a short period of time.128 Even
though immigrants who are ineligible for federal housing assistance due to their
immigration status do not receive such benefits under the current law, “HUD falsely
claim[ed] that the proposed rule [was] necessary to prevent undocumented
immigrants from utilizing federal housing assistance.”129
Furthermore, in October 2020, the Trump administration significantly raised
various immigration application fees.130 Many families seeking to apply for lawful
family-separation-under-trump-administration-timeline (providing a timeline of the “zero tolerance”
policy from March 2017 to May 2020).
125. See Press Release, House Comm. on the Judiciary, Judiciary Committee Releases Report on Trump

Administration Family Separation Policy (Oct. 29, 2020), https://judiciary.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=3442 (“As a result, efforts to reunify separated children continue to
this day.”); see also Miriam Jordan, Separated Families: A Legacy Biden Has Inherited From Trump, N.Y.
Times (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/01/us/immigration-family-separationsbiden.html (last updated Feb. 6, 2021) (“More than 1,000 migrant children still in the United States
likely remain separated from their parents, and another 500 or more were taken from their parents who
have yet to be located, according to the latest estimates from lawyers working on the issue.”).

126. Milicent Sasu, HUD’s “Mixed-Status” Rule Is the Latest Attack on the Immigrant Community, Nat’l Immigr.

L. Ctr. (July 8, 2019), https://www.nilc.org/2019/07/08/huds-mixed-status-rule-is-the-latest-attack-onthe-immigrant-community/; see also Housing and Community Development Act of 1980: Verification of
Eligible Status, 84 Fed. Reg. 20589 (proposed May 10, 2019) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 5) (official
proposed rule). In the context of access to public benefits, “[m]ixed-status families are households where
member(s) who are eligible for public housing assistance live with member(s) who are ineligible for housing
assistance due to their immigration status.” Sasu, supra (parenthesis in original). As of the time of the
writing of this essay, this rule has not yet been implemented. See Housing and Community Development
Act of 1980: Verification of Eligible Status Rulemaking Docket, Regulations.gov, https://www.
regulations.gov/docket/HUD-2019-0044/unified-agenda (last visited Apr. 14, 2021) (reflecting that no
final action on HUD’s proposed rule was published in the Federal Register).

127. See Sasu, supra note 126 (“If this rule is implemented, HUD will . . . require all household members

under age 62 to have their immigration status screened and would change the citizenship and
immigration verification requirements for U.S. citizens and noncitizens over age 62.”).

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Fee Schedule and Changes to Certain Other Immigration

Benefit Request Requirements, 85 Fed. Reg. 46788 (Aug. 3, 2020) (codified in scattered parts of 8
C.F.R.) (effective Oct. 2, 2020); see also Claire Hansen, Trump Administration Nearly Doubles Cost to
Apply to Become a U.S. Citizen, U.S. News (July 31, 2020), https://www.usnews.com/news/nationalnews/articles/2020-07-31/trump-administration-nearly-doubles-cost-to-apply-to-become-a-us-citizen
(“The Trump administration [] significantly increased fees for a number of immigration and work
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permanent residence could potentially be priced out due to this significant fee
increase. In addition, the administration sought to make it more difficult for eligible
immigrants to receive a fee waiver for certain immigrant benefits applications,
including naturalization, by proposing to remove the receipt of means-tested
benefits—a proof that a person is receiving public assistance—as a sufficient criterion
for an automatic fee reduction.131 A federal judge in California halted this change in
December 2019, allowing immigrants to continue to apply for fee waivers for their
naturalization applications.132
Since March 2020, the Trump administration increasingly used COVID-19 as an
excuse to seal shut both the northern and southern land borders of the United States,
and to halt most immigration for an indefinite period.133 U.S. consulates and embassies
abroad remained open for emergencies only and visa services were suspended.134
Europeans, Brazilians, and Chinese persons were banned from traveling to the United
States, while domestic U.S. COVID-19 infection numbers soared.135 Naturalization
ceremonies and in-person interviews for all immigration benefits stopped for months
authorization applications, including the fee to apply for naturalization.”). For example, the cost to apply
online to become a citizen increased by 81%, from $640 to $1,160. Id.
131. See USCIS Updates Fee Waiver Requirements, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., https://www.uscis.

gov/news/news-releases/uscis-updates-fee-waiver-requirements (last updated Oct. 25, 2019) (discussing
the revised criteria for obtaining a fee waiver for immigration documents); see also Geneva Sands, Federal
Court Halts Trump Administration Changes to Fee Waiver for Citizenship, CNN, https://www.cnn.
com/2019/12/10/politics/federal-court-halts-changes-fee-waiver-for-naturalization/index.html (last
updated Dec. 13, 2019) (reporting that organizations who were challenging the rule “argued that the
new agency rules would make it harder to qualify for a fee waiver”).

132. Sands, supra note 131; see also City of Seattle v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 3:19-CV-07151-MMC

(N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2019) (granting nationwide preliminary injunction).

133. See John Washington, The Trump Administration is Using the Pandemic as an Excuse to Target Immigrants and

Asylum Seekers, Vox (May 15, 2020), https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/2020/5/15/21260075/trumpimmigrants-refugee-asylum-covid-pandemic-detention-centers (“Covid-19 has been a boon to the
anti-immigrant agenda that President Trump . . . has been aching to implement since he took office[.]”); see
also Zolan Kanno-Youngs & Kirk Semple, Trump Cites Coronavirus as He Announces a Border Crackdown, N.Y.
Times (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/20/us/politics/trump-border-coronavirus.html
(last updated Mar. 27, 2020) (reporting the closures of the southern and northern borders to tourism and the
suspension of processing undocumented immigrants due to COVID-19).

134. Suspension of Routine Visa Services, U.S. Dep’t of State, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/

News/visas-news/suspension-of-routine-visa-services.html (last updated July 22, 2020). Humeyra
Pamuk, U.S. Suspending Visa Services Worldwide Due to Coronavirus, Reuters (Mar. 18, 2020), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-usa-visas/u-s-suspending-visa-services-worldwidedue-to-coronavirus-state-department-idUSKBN2153NP.

135. Travelers Prohibited from Entry to the United States, Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention,

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/travelers/from-other-countries.html (last updated Feb. 19,
2021). As of January 2021, presidential proclamations were issued restricting “the entry of [foreign
nationals] into the United States” who had been in China, Iran, the European Schengen Area, the
United Kingdom, Republic of Ireland, Brazil, or South Africa within the past fourteen days. Id.
However, “citizens and lawful permanent residents of the United States, certain family members, and
other individuals who [met] specified exceptions, who [had] been in one of [those] countries . . . in the
past [fourteen] days” were still permitted to enter the United States. Id.

217

THE INVISIBLE WALL

N

and slowly reopened in the summer of 2020, in a limited capacity only.136 These new
restraints on immigration were carried out with little fanfare and seemingly few
objections from the public, as Americans faced the overwhelming dual challenges of
skyrocketing domestic coronavirus cases and soaring unemployment.
While the physical border wall is nowhere near completion, and its future
construction looks uncertain in the early months of the Biden administration,137
these few examples out of many comprise the “invisible wall” built by the Trump
administration and have had an arguably more pernicious effect than the physical
wall. The aforementioned executive orders, regulations, and policies effectively
barred many individuals from entering the United States.
IV. UNINTENDED OR INTENDED CONSEQUENCES?

While the anticipated consequences of the Trump administration’s immigration
policy changes are clear, there are other consequences that are as harmful but perhaps
not as readily discernable. As early as 2017 and out of fear that their “green card”
applications would be denied and they would be ultimately deported, immigrants
earning low wages started withdrawing from public benefit programs to which their
U.S.-born citizen children might be entitled, such as food assistance.138 Likewise,
immigrant parents to U.S. citizen children are often afraid to allow their children to
access low-cost or free school lunches for fear that it might negatively impact their
136. Peggy Gleason & Ariel Brown, Immigrant Legal Res. Ctr., Temporary Changes to U.S.

Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in Response to COVID-19 2 (Dec. 18, 2020),
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/practice_alert_uscis_updates_covid19_dec_2020_
update.pdf. All U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in-person services were suspended
on March 18, 2020. Id. In-person services included “scheduled adjustment, naturalization, affirmative
asylum, and other interviews, . . . biometrics appointments at Application Support Centers (ASCs), and
all naturalization oath ceremonies.” Id. (parenthetical in original). All services were suspended through
June 3, 2020 and on June 4, 2020, USCIS began resuming only some in-person services. Id.; see also
USCIS Preparing to Resume Public Services on June 4, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. (May 27,
2020), https://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/uscis-preparing-to-resume-public-services-on-june-4
(announcing that the USCIS is resuming “non-emergency public services” in limited capacity with
respect to its asylum offices, ASCs, naturalization ceremonies, interviews, and appointments).

137. See Proclamation No. 10142, 86 Fed. Reg. 7225 (Jan. 20, 2021) (outlining President Joe Biden’s plans to

halt the construction of the border wall for the foreseeable future). See also Sabrina Rodriguez, Trump’s
Partially Built ‘Big, Beautiful Wall ’, POLITICO ( Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.politico.com/
news/2021/01/12/trump-border-wall-partially-built-458255. The initial order to pause construction on
the wall expired on March 20, 2021. Mia Jancowicz, Biden’s Order to Pause Construction on Trump’s Wall
Expires on March 20. Nobody Knows What Happens Next, Bus. Insider (Mar. 16, 2021, 9:47 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/what-happen-end-biden-60-day-pause-border-wall-work-2021-3. See
also Thomas Colson, The Biden administration says it may restart construction of the border wall to fill ‘gaps’
left by Trump, Bus. Insider (Apr. 7, 2021, 7:53 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/biden-restartborder-wall-construction-trump-pledge-gaps-2021-4.

138. See Emily Baumgaertner, Spooked by Trump Proposals, Immigrants Abandon Public Nutrition Services, N.Y.

Times (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/06/us/politics/trump-immigrants-publicnutrition-services.html (reporting that public benefit programs were seeing declines in participation
between 2016 and 2017); see also Changes to “Public Charge” Inadmissibility Rule, supra note 12,
at 4.
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own immigration applications.139 Fear also keeps immigrants from seeking public
medical services.140 Importantly, few government benefit programs are even available
to immigrants before they become lawful permanent residents and receive their
“green cards.” 141 Nevertheless, the impacts of the “invisible wall” policies on
immigrants, particularly mixed-status families, are substantial.
Studies have found that the implementation of the new public charge rule would
directly impact immigrant families.142 Specifically, the rule would have a
disproportionate effect on mixed-status households originally from Latin America,
Asia, and Africa, in their ability to sponsor non-citizen family members to either
immigrate to the United States or adjust within the country to receive lawful
permanent residency.143 Additionally, the totality of the circumstances test for
determining whether someone is likely to become a public charge unduly impacted
families whose income was below 125 percent of the U.S. federal poverty line.144
Families with income and assets above this threshold would have a factor in their
favor toward establishing financial security in the eyes of the DHS, while those
below would not.145 Many families from Latin America, Asia, and Africa do not earn
enough income or own financial assets that exceed 125 percent of the U.S. federal
poverty line for their family size, while immigrants from Western Europe meet this
financial threshold more often.146 As a result, another consequence of the new public
139. See Zaidee Stavely, California School Officials Reassure Immigrant Parents After Ruling Limiting Benefits,

EdSource (Jan. 31, 2020), https://edsource.org/2020/california-school-officials-reassure-immigrantparents-after-ruling-limiting-benefits/623231 (explaining how “immigrant families are [] disenrolling
or choosing not to enroll their children in public benefit programs” even though “benefits used by U.S.
citizen children” should not be considered in determining the parent immigrants’ applications).

140. Brianna Ehley et al., Fearing Deportation, Immigrants Forgo Medical Care, POLITICO (July 17, 2017),

https://w w w.politico.com/story/2017/07/17/deportation-fears-under-trump-have-immigrantsforgoing-medical-care-240635.

141. See Tanya Broder et al., Nat’l Immigr. L. Ctr., Overview of Immigrant Eligibility for

Federal Programs (Dec. 2015), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/overviewimmeligfedprograms-2015-12-09.pdf (discussing immigrant eligibility requirements for federal public
benefit programs). As mentioned earlier, there were significant changes in immigrant access to public
benefits at the federal level following the passage of PRWORA and IIRIRA in 1996. See supra notes
85–95 and accompanying text.

142. See, e.g., Batalova et al., Through the Back Door: Remaking the Immigration System via the Expected “Public-

Charge” Rule, Migration Pol’y Inst. (Aug. 2018), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/throughback-door-remaking-immigration-system-expected-public-charge-rule (using 2014–2016 data from the
U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey and the 2008 Survey of Income and Program
Participation to predict the effect of the new public charge rule on immigrant families).

143. Id.
144. See Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg.

28689 (Mar. 26, 1999), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1999-05-26/pdf/99-13202.pdf. The
USCIS has been applying the 1999 Field Guidance since March 9, 2021, when the order vacating the
Public Charge Final Rule went into effect. USCIS Pol’y Manual, ch.9 (U.S. Citizenship & Immigr.
Servs. 2021), https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-8-part-g.

145. Id.
146. Batalova et al., supra note 142.
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charge rule was that it disproportionally impacted communities of color.147 Thus,
family-based immigration was impacted in a manner not seen since the Immigration
Act of 1924, which imposed national origin-based quotas, continued to exclude
Chinese and Asian immigrants, and expanded upon the literacy tests present in the
1917 federal immigration laws.148 The new rule also evoked the nativist hostility
encountered by early immigrant populations, specifically the Irish, in the early
twentieth century.149
The chilling effects of the new public charge rule and other policy changes
impacting the lives of immigrants in the United States have been magnified by the
COVID-19 pandemic.150 Some immigrant families were reluctant to seek medical
attention for coronavirus symptoms for fear of potential public charge consequences.151
Immigration advocates and health policy experts worried that the Trump
administration’s explicit and implicit antipathy towards immigrants would hamper
public health efforts to control the spread of the virus.152 U.S. citizens and immigrants
alike lost their jobs at alarming numbers, and consequently often found themselves
without health insurance.153 Many immigrants, and most undocumented immigrants,
are not eligible for federally funded Medicaid and coverage under the Affordable

147. See id.
148. See generally The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act), U.S. Dep’t of State: Off. Of the

Historian, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/immigration-act (last visited Apr. 14,
2021).

149. See Ibrahim Hirsi, Trump Administration’s ‘Public Charge’ Provision has Roots in Colonial US, The World

(Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-12-19/trump-administration-s-public-chargeprovision-has-roots-colonial-us (“‘The public charge provision was truly central to early immigration
control in America, and that still remains true today[.]’”).

150. See Jose F. Figueroa et al., The Trump Administration’s ‘Public Charge’ Rule and COVID-19: Bad Policy at

the Worst Time, STAT News (Aug. 21, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/08/21/the-trumpadministrations-public-charge-rule-and-covid-19-bad-policy-at-the-worst-time/ (“[T]he Trump
administration has enacted policies making the spread of Covid-19 in immigrant communities even
more likely.”).

151. Id. This fear existed even despite the fact that the USCIS announced on March 13, 2020 that it “will

not consider ‘testing, treatment, nor preventative care . . . related to COVID-19’ as part of a publiccharge determination . . . .” Practice Alert: COVID-19 and the Public Charge Rule, Am. Immigr. Laws.
Ass’n (June 15, 2020), https://www.aila.org/advo-media/aila-practice-pointers-and-alerts/practicealert-covid-19-and-the-public-charge-rule.

152. Miriam Jordan, ‘We’re Petrified’: Immigrants Afraid to Seek Medical Care for Coronavirus, N.Y. Times

(Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/18/us/coronavirus-immigrants.html (last updated
May 12, 2020).

153. See Rachel Garfield et al., Eligibility for ACA Health Coverage Following Job Loss, Kaiser Fam. Found.

(May 13, 2020), https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/eligibility-for-aca-healthcoverage-following-job-loss/ (“In addition to loss of income, job loss carries the risk of loss of health
insurance . . . .”).
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Care Act.154 In states without additional state-funded Medicaid for poor immigrants,
these persons are simply uninsured.155
Others have been hesitant to seek necessary medical care due to fears that they
might be subject to ICE enforcement actions at hospitals.156 While ICE considers
medical facilities to be “sensitive locations”157 where arrests of immigrants for
suspected civil immigration violations are to be avoided absent exigent circumstances,
immigration advocates and media report that there have been arrests at hospitals,
even during the COVID-19 pandemic.158 As a result, marginalized groups, including
low- and middle-income immigrant families, have been disproportionately impacted
by the COVID-19 pandemic due to limited access to healthcare and fear of negative
immigration repercussions.159
V. CONCLUSION: HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF

Like the nativist and Know Nothings of the late 1800s, the Trump administration
presented familiar assertions in an attempt to blame immigrants for various societal
ills to gain political favor. These assertions rest on the belief that immigrants come
154. Id.; Holly Straught-Eppsteiner, To Ensure Collective Health and Safety, Federal Packages for COVID-19

Relief Must Include Immigrant Communities, Nat’l Immigr. L. Ctr. (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.nilc.
org/2020/04/21/federal-packages-for-covid19-relief-must-include-immigrant-communities-the-torch/.

155. See Health Coverage of Immigrants, Kaiser Fam. Found. (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.kff.org/racial-

equity-and-health-policy/fact-sheet/health-coverage-of-immigrants/ (reporting that the lower incomes
typically earned by noncitizens presents barriers to affording either employer-sponsored coverage or
coverage through the individual or Affordable Care Act marketplaces); see also Randy Capps & Julia
Gelatt, Barriers to COVID-19 Testing and Treatment: Immigrants Without Health Insurance Coverage in the
United States, Migration Pol’y Inst. (May 2020), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/
publications/UninsuredNoncitizens-FS_Final.pdf (“[N]oncitizens are substantially more likely [than
citizens] to be uninsured[] . . . .”).

156. Establishing Sanctuary Hospitals: Protecting the Right to Access Health Care, Physicians For Hum. Rts. 1,

https://phr.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/PHR-Sanctuary-Hospitals-Fact-Sheet-FINAL.pdf (last
visited Apr. 14, 2021).

157. FAQs: Sensitive Locations and Courthouse Arrests, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, https://www.ice.gov/

ero/enforcement/sensitive-loc (last updated Feb. 2, 2021).

158. E.g., Peter Hall, ICE Criticized for Arrest at Scranton Hospital, Morning Call (Mar. 16, 2020), https://

www.mcall.com/news/pennsylvania/mc-nws-pa-ice-immigrant-arrest-hospital-scranton-coronavirus20200316-3itqa24pdfau3kjnkm62jcdsai-story.html (describing how ICE arrested a Honduran immigrant
as he was leaving an emergency room in Scranton, Pennsylvania). Jeff Gammage, Will I Get Detained By
ICE If I Go To A Hospital?, Phila. Inquirer (Apr. 6, 2020) (advising undocumented immigrants to only
go to hospitals if they are “terribly sick” and noting that grounds surrounding hospitals are “not necessarily
safe for undocumented people”). But see Nat’l Immigr. L. Ctr., Health Care Providers and
Immigration Enforcement: Know Your Rights, Know Your Patients’ Rights 2 (Apr. 2017),
https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Protecting-Access-to-Health-Care-2017-04-17.pdf
(“[I]mmigration enforcement actions are to be avoided at sensitive locations, including at hospitals and
other health care facilities, unless exigent circumstances exist or the officers conducting the actions have
prior approval from certain officials within the enforcement agencies.”).

159. Capps & Gelatt, supra note 155; Eva Clark et al., Disproportionate Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on

Immigrant Communities in the United States, PLOS Neglected Tropical Diseases, (July 13, 2020),
https://journals.plos.org/plosntds/article?id=10.1371/journal.pntd.0008484.
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to the United States to abuse public benefit programs,160 when the reality is that most
are precluded from accessing any type of federal entitlements for a period of at least
five years from obtaining lawful permanent residence, if they are eligible at all.161
Another claim is that immigrants take American jobs, thereby hurting the U.S.
economy and workers.162 Economists regularly rebut this contention by showing a net
gain between immigration and job growth.163
Additionally, the hundreds of Trump administration modifications to
immigration law and policy furthered its assault on immigrants, particularly lowand middle-income. These changes are harmful to the wellbeing of immigrant
families, including U.S. citizen children. These rules and policies also undermine
the integration of immigrants, who may one day become U.S. citizens.
Much of my great-grandfather’s story has been lost to history. Yet, despite his
illiteracy and humble background, he became a U.S. citizen in 1945. His race, sex,
and non-disabled status were the main requirements at the time for the opportunity
to enter the United States, as these characteristics apparently proved that he would
not be solely reliant on government benefits for his survival. Under the Trump
160. See President Donald J. Trump is Ensuring Non-Citizens Do Not Abuse Our Nation’s Public Benefit, The

White House (Aug. 12, 2019), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/presidentdonald-j-trump-ensuring-non-citizens-not-abuse-nations-public-benefit/?utm_source=twitter&utm_
medium=social&utm_campaign=wh (“We must ensure that non-citizens do not abuse our public
benefit programs and jeopardize the social safety net needed by vulnerable Americans.”).

161. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (Welfare Reform Act), Pub. L.

No. 104-193, §§ 402–03, 110 Stat. 2105, 2262, 2265 (1996) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1612–
13 (2020)) (requiring certain immigrants to be lawful United States residents for five years before they
are eligible to receive federal public benefits). See generally Broder et al., supra note 141.

162. Josh Boak, AP Fact Check: Trump Plays on Immigration Myths, PBS News Hour (Feb. 8., 2019), https://

www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/ap-fact-check-trump-plays-on-immigration-myths.

163. Id.; see also Dany Bahar, A Spicy Red Sauce and How Immigrants Generate Jobs and Growth in the US,

Brookings (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2017/02/07/a-spicy-red-sauceand-how-immigrants-generate-jobs-and-growth-in-the-us/ (“Overwhelming evidence shows that
migrants are an important ingredient in the recipe of economic growth, while little to no evidence supports
the claim that they are, instead, a threat to America’s national security.”); see also Undocumented Immigrants’
State & Local Tax Contributions, Inst. on Tax’n & Econ. Pol’y (Mar. 2, 2017), https://itep.org/
immigration/ (providing “data that helps dispute the erroneous ideas espoused [by] President Trump[] . . .
that undocumented immigrants are a drain to taxpayers”). See generally Daniel Costa et al., Econ.
Pol’y Inst., Facts About Immigration and the U.S. Economy (Aug. 12, 2014), https://files.epi.org/
pdf/68129.pdf. Moreover, the U.S. immigration system has checks in place, such as the labor market test,
to assess whether there are any willing, qualified, and available U.S. workers for a given position. See
Working in the United States: Permanent Workers, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., https://www.uscis.
gov/working-in-the-united-states/permanent-workers (last updated Jan. 9, 2020) (nothing that before an
employer may sponsor an immigrant, the employer must obtain a labor certification). A labor certification
will only be granted if there “are insufficient available, qualified, and willing U.S. workers to fill the
position being offered at the prevailing wage” and “[h]iring a foreign worker will not adversely affect the
wages and working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers.” Id. “The goal of the Labor Certification
Process is to make sure that foreign workers are not taking jobs from qualified U.S. workers.” See PERM
Labor Certification, Curran, Berger & Kludt Immigr. L., https://cbkimmigration.com/employmentbased-immigration/perm-labor-certification/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2021) (describing the steps employers
must take to obtain a certification, including the labor market test).
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administration’s “invisible wall” of anti-immigrant policies, those with far greater
resources, education, family ties, and abilities than my great-grandfather would not
be as fortunate.
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